Indian Frontier Policy - Tournament of Shadows

"Tournament of Shadows" as many called it was the rivalry of British Empire and Russian Empire in their pursuit to dominate Central Asia.Though history text books seldom mention the "The Great Game" (Tournament of Shadows), as a history lover I felt that it is an interesting topic to ponder over as for over a century, Central Asia still remains a Geo-political-strategic mystery. Tournament of Shadows had similar features like Cold War and doesn't have a precise starting date. The end of this quest to dominate Central Asia was followed by World War 1, World War 2, Start of Cold War, End of Cold War and "War on Terrorism", all the previous event which got mentioned had active participation of Russia and Britain either as an ally or a foe.

Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) which devastated Central Europe culminated with the 1649 Westphalian sovereignty where European powers agreed to respect the sovereignty of their neighbors didn’t transcend into Central Asia and the Indian sub continent. India was a precious territory and European powers were more than enthusiastic to posses India.

When keys are handed over to the new owner of 10 Downing Street, there is an unwritten custom where the predecessor passes on vital verbal advice to his successor - for example "Keep your hands away from Central Asia". Lessons learnt by Soviet Union for their misadventure in Afghanistan are now being taught to America. White House is calculating the number of days left for American soldiers to leave Afghanistan a midst the incomplete goal to destroy Al-Qaeda, unresolved aim to stabilize the democratic government of Afghanistan and unachieved target to confiscate the presence of Taliban in Afghanistan.

India was British Empire's jewelry which it used to flaunt proudly before the world but they were constantly on vigil as they feared that they can lose their precious possession if they cannot contain Russia in Central Asia.

North West frontier of India was dominated by Sikhs, but their decline started with Sino-Sikh war followed by the results of first and second Anglo-Sikh wars, where the British eventually got hold of small but crucial part of Central Asia. John Miller Adye was a British General who served during the Crimean War (fought between Russia and Britain), India's First War of Independence (1857) and he took part in British Empire's progress in India’s North West frontier. General Adye gives an awe-inspiring description of British Empire's policy in India on the North West frontier in his book "Indian Frontier Policy" first published in 1897

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Indian Frontier Policy by General Sir John Miller Adye

General Adye starts the book with the below preface.

The subject of our policy on the North-West frontier of India is one of great importance, as affecting the general welfare of our Eastern Empire, and is especially interesting at the present time, when military operations on a considerable scale are being conducted against a combination of the independent tribes along the frontier.

It must be understood that the present condition of affairs is no mere sudden outbreak on the part of our turbulent neighbors. Its causes lie far deeper, and are the consequences of events in bygone years.

In the following pages I have attempted to give a short historical summary of its varying phases, in the hope that I may thus assist the public in some degree to understand its general bearings, and to form a correct opinion of the policy which should be pursued in the future.

CHAPTER ONE:

General Adye provides us with some tidbits of history where the two great emperors, Alexander and Napoleon planned to invade India but weren't able to do it. In March 1809, the Shah of Persia decided not to permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia towards India and very interestingly General Adye feels that a visionary danger was avoided by this action. Of course, not much information is provided on why Shah of Persia passed such a resolution, but it seems that this deed was needed to avoid catastrophe.

The policy of British Empire to conquer Afghanistan was framed based on two reasons.

1. To restrict the advances made by Russia in Central Asia.
2. People of Afghanistan and Independent tribes.

The first reason was more important and framed the initial policy of British Empire to conquer Afghanistan. The second policy turned out to be one of the reasons which will make the British retreat from Afghanistan in their first attempt and change their policies in future.

British tried the diplomatic option to convince Dost Mohammad Khan to get his support to conquer parts of Afghanistan but Russia had managed to get him on their side, as Russia has promised money and army which Dost Mohammad Khan intended to use for defeating “Ranjith Singh”, the Sikh ruler -- which would make easy for Russia’s entry into "Hindustan". The British Empire was never on a settling ground regarding the idea to conquer to Afghanistan, there was a huge opposition to the idea of conquering Afghanistan. The Duke of Wellington said that

'Our difficulties would commence where our military successes ended,' and that 'the consequences of crossing the Indus once, to settle a Government in Afghanistan, will be a perennial march, into that country'

Many officers of the British Empire believed that the advancement into Afghanistan would make them weak as Afghans are known to be neutrals and invading their lands would only make them revolt against the British which would end by making the British weak and putting Russians in a stronger position.

The British with the help of Shah Soojah were able to march across Sindh and Baluchistan. Shah Soojah replaced Dost Mohammad Khan who fled to north of the Hindu Kush which eventually lead to a power sharing agreement among the British, Shah Soojah and Sikhs. But the British soon realized that the situation is not going to be the same.

We come to understand the policy of British Empire when we realize that their policy on Afghanistan is totally based on Russia, even though many British officers believed that their stay in Afghanistan is not appreciated, but at the same they wanted to move ahead just to counter Russia. Sir Alexander Burnes says:

'I maintain that man to be an enemy to his country who recommends a soldier to be stationed west of the Indus; 'while at the same moment he advocated the advance of our troops over the Hindoo Koosh into Balkh, so as to be ready to meet the Russians.

British Empire even thought of going beyond Afghanistan just to apprehend the Russians but there was truth which they were about to face, circumstances which made British leave Afghanistan are

• Sikhs were no longer loyal to British.
• Indigenous troubles in Baluchistan.
• Shah Soojah's lack of authority was culminating into a bigger problem.
• The whole of Afghanistan was in the mood to revolt against British.
• Sir Alexander Burnes and many officers got killed by the local people.
• The winter was about to show its harshness and the British weren't prepared to face it.
• Soldiers were badly wounded.
• There was no communication system to contact with Indian Government.

Eventually, the British had to leave Afghanistan, as General Adye puts it "The British force at Kabul, leaving its guns, stores and treasure behind, commenced its retreat on January 6, 1842".

CHAPTER TWO

Russia was making advances in Central Asia, it now controlled some parts of Persia and some parts of Northern Afghanistan and as expected, British Empire was watchful.General Adye compares and lists out the positives of British over Russians.

• British soldiers are well trained, Russia cannot rely on untrained soldiers in down of Central Asia.
• British India has geographical advantage over barren lands and sterile deserts occupied by Russia.
• Population of regions occupied by Russia is low (5 million) when compared with Indian Population of 250 million.
• India has advantage of roads, railway tracks, food which the other side lacks.

British occupied Sindh and Punjab defeating the Sikhs in 1843 and 1849, geographically, now they were close to Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Adye quotes Sir Robert Sandeman who describes the nature of country along the border

'… the North-West frontier of India was advanced across the river Indus to the foot of the rocky mountains which separate the plains of the Indus valley from the higher plateaus of Afghanistan and Khelat. These mountain ranges formed a vast irregular belt of independent or semi-independent territory, extending from Cashmere southward to the sea near Kurrachee, a total length of about 1,200 miles.'

The belt of territory above described was 'inhabited by fierce marauding tribes, often at war with each other, ever and anon harrying the plains of the Punjaub and Scinde, and the constant terror of the trade caravans during their journey through the passes.'

The British did learn a lesson from the first Afghan war, now they have a different approach towards Afghanistan and its people.

• The British started to recognize and respect the borders of the various independent tribes of Afghanistan.
• They actively pursued friendly relations with the independent tribes.
• They built roads, canals along the border.
• Improved business ties with the local population.

General Adye mentions that religion was a complicated matter after the annexation of Punjab and mentions that they had to deal with 'Sikhs who were Hindus', Punjabi Muslims and local races. General Adye make a very significant point about Russia, he says..

This elevated region consists of a mass of bare snow-capped mountains attaining elevations of over 25,000 feet, intersected by plateaux almost as devoid of vegetation as the mountains themselves. The lakes are about 12,000 feet above the sea, the population is scanty, and consists chiefly of nomads in search of food and pasture during the short summer; so that although the Russians might, if unopposed, possibly move in small isolated detachments carrying their own food and munitions over the Pamirs, it would only be to lose themselves in the gorges of the Himalayas.

The conditions above mentioned are for the most part permanent. Russia may not, and probably has not, any intention of trying to invade and conquer India—but she has not the power, which is a far more important consideration.

Dost Mohammad Khan returned to occupy his previous position, but now the country was divided into many pieces. Dost Mahomed died in June, 1863, he was succeeded by his son Shere Ali. Shere Ali never liked the idea of British soldiers staying on his land and the British conceded to his wishes and maintained friendly relations. Relations between Russia and Britain weren't good in Europe, Russia was making gains in Central Asia – British was making advances in Afghanistan and started building bridges over Indus. Relations between Shere Ali and British weren't well and Russian diplomacy again wins by making Shere Ali go against the British. The British had no option but to make advances into Afghanistan. British wanted to establish a strategic triangle in Afghanistan by occupying Kabul, Ghazni and Jalalabad but that strategy didn't work due to inimical circumstances.

After the death of Shere Ali, he was succeeded by his son Yakoob Khan, British Empire made huge gains in Afghanistan but they weren't able to control the territories which they have occupied. Adye says:

At the close of war, we had over 70,000 men in Afghanistan, or on the border in reserve; and even then we really only held the territory within range of our guns. The whole country had been disintegrated and was in anarchy; whilst the total cost of the war exceeded twenty millions sterling, being about the same amount as had been expended in the former great war of 1839-41.

The British had to retreat from Afghanistan for the second time. The failure to control Afghanistan even though they occupied most territories can be attributed to the reasons mentioned below.

• The driving policy behind the occupation of Afghanistan was still Russia.
• Unable to control independent tribes of Afghanistan.
• The geographical terrain which is not similar to India.
• The fierce nature of Afghan tribes turned Afghanistan into a dysfunctional state.
• Stationing of soldiers in Afghanistan for long period was a difficult task.

CHAPTER THREE

Russia was making improvements in South and West of Central Asia, they occupied the east belt of Caspian and they were actively building the infrastructure which got them connected to Persia and some parts of Afghanistan. British have seen this as Russia’s policy against Indian Empire.

In 1885 Russians attacked Penjdeh and drove away the Afghan troops, this incident almost made a direct confrontation between Russia and Britain imminent in Afghanistan but again the diplomatic efforts between Russia and Britain came to the rescue which avoided confrontation of troops. General Adye quotes Sir West Ridgeway:

'If Russians were to cross the difficult passes of the Hindoo Koosh, and entangle his army in the barren mountain homes of the fanatical and treacherous Afghan, then indeed our fortunate generals may well congratulate themselves that the Lord has delivered the enemy into their hand….'

Russia and Britain no longer considered each other as an enemy with respect to Afghanistan. But, British troops were facing hard time with the independent tribes of Afghanistan. General Adye says:

It is perfectly well known, and has been proved by long experience, that these frontier tribes value their independence and liberties, beyond everything else, and will not submit peacefully to interference; and if they were not consulted in the arrangements just described, we may begin to trace the origin of the present crisis.

The Indian Government realized that peace with tribes is the only feasible option for successful presence of the British in Afghanistan and for that to happen the various tribes of Afghanistan should be at peace. The Indian Government proposed the Durand Agreement to resolve the differences among the tribes of Afghanistan. In 1876 the ruler of Chitral voluntarily tendered his allegiance to the Maharajah of Kashmir and tried to persuade rulers of Swat, Bajour, and Dir to do the same but that never happened. British were again back to their obsession with Russia, Kashmir troops were used to occupy Gilgit and Sir Adye says..

Hindoo Koosh — a region where Nature has constructed for us perhaps one of the most formidable frontiers in the world.

General Adye was constantly against the idea of stationing British troops in Afghanistan. He says:

In a mere military point of view, it was a repetition of the policy pursued of recent years of establishing isolated military posts in countries belonging to others, or in their vicinity; inevitably tending to aggravate the tribes, and which in time of trouble, instead of increasing our strength, are and have been the cause of anxiety to ourselves. Therefore, not only as a matter of policy, but in a purely military sense, the arrangement was dangerous.

The British were in no agreement to occupy Chitral but later the decision to occupy Chitral came after the change in government in England. Surprisingly the troops of British were constantly being attacked by the tribes and never in the history of Afghanistan were the tribes united until the cause to revolt against the British Empire. The British troops eventually had to retreat again from many areas of Afghanistan and in the end as a kind of conclusion General Adye says..

A policy of patience, conciliation, and subsidies, is far more likely to attain our object than incessant costly expeditions into their mountains.

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The events chronicled by General Sir John Miller Adye provides us the basic background and a good idea of the British-Afghan wars and at the same time it gives the strategic drawbacks of the British Empire in Afghanistan. Going the events of the last decade in Afghanistan I can safely assume that the situation compels us to look into history as the same complexity still prevails in the region.

The Soviet Union had their foot in almost every region of Afghanistan but they weren’t able to conquer it. Americans have been fighting their war against terrorism in Afghanistan for over a decade with very less results of democracy and arguably killing of Osama Bin Laden (which happened in Pakistan). Many believe that America has no option but to leave Afghanistan with or without safeguarding the new democracy of Afghanistan.

India had a limited role to play in the recent history of Afghanistan, the affairs of Afghanistan were predominantly under the influence of Pakistan. It may be of strategic importance for India to have a good control of Afghanistan but there would be very less scope for error if India tires to pursue it aggressively.

Some have advocated that India should send it soldiers to Afghanistan but there are many strategic experts who strongly believe that such step would be a disaster.

The proposal to deploy Indian troops in Afghanistan is based on the simple logic of force fungibility. That since it is not feasible for Indian troops to directly attack Pakistan’s military-jihadi complex, India should ensure that US troops do so. Since it is in India’s interests that as many US soldiers are committed to operations ‘along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border’, it is sensible to relieve US troops of duties in areas where they are not actually fighting the taliban—especially in Western and Northern Afghanistan.

General Adye has iterated that such actions by British never yielded the expected results and in turn it was a financial burden, loss of soldiers and planted seeds of hatred. India’s role after 9/11 in Afghanistan is limited to Non-Military activities, it has been building infrastructure in Afghanistan like schools, parliament, roads, power projects etc.. I feel that it should continue to do it without trying any kind of stout adventures.

India may pursue to take the position of an effective strategic partner to Afghanistan and try to push its interests passively in future without hurting the Afghans and also try to minimize the influence of Pakistan. William Dalrymple wrote an essay Deadly Triangle – Afghanistan, Pakistan and India in which he gives a good narration of recent history of Afghanistan. There are many points raised by Dalrymple which are worthy of debate. Though Dalrymple puts a formidable argument about India’s involvement but it would be farfetched to accept such hastened conclusions.

The continuation of clashes between India and Pakistan in—and over—Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal is dangerous for all countries in the region and for the world.

For more than 150 years there was hardly any stability in the region and some suggest that partition of Afghanistan may be the only viable solution. Professor Brahma Chellaney wrote about Afghanistan's Unavoidable Partition where he talks about "soft" and "hard" partition.

A weak, partitioned Afghanistan may not be a desirable outcome; but a "soft" partition now would be far better than a "hard" partition later, after years of chaos and bloodletting – and infinitely better than the medieval Taliban’s return to power and a fresh reign of terror. Indeed, partition may be the only way to prevent Afghanistan from sliding into large-scale civil war and to thwart transnational terrorists from reestablishing a base of operations in the rubble.

Finding a plausible strategic approach for the future of Afghanistan may not be an easy task for anyone and especially for India it would be more than a challenging task as it has a neighbor like Pakistan to deal and convincing the independent ethnic groups of which some are cynical about India and most of them are not default allies like Northern Alliance. As General Adye suggested it would be better to have patience and build conciliation when India is not the direct enemy or a friend.

Now the Afghanistan Govt, Taliban and American Govt believe that death of Mullah Omar in a Karachi, Pakistan hospital in 2013 is “credible”, the region has now become more volatile. Pakistan is strongly pushing for talks between Taliban and Afghanistan government. It seems that USA, Britain and Pakistan have come to an agreement on how Afghanistan would be handled post the total withdrawal of American troops. Recently, Taliban had nothing but praise for China and for their involvement in Afghanistan. Some groups of Taliban have shown their allegiance towards Islamic State (IS), reportedly IS have taken control of small parts of Afghanistan. India was not allowed to actively participate in any of the matters related to Afghanistan by NATO allies.

If rational logic and a prudent hindsight has some space in South Block then India would never think of being aggressive over the issue of Afghanistan. Whimsical thoughts like sending troops to Afghanistan will never yield results for India in the long run, it would only complicate the matters beyond repair. India should send its troops to Afghanistan only if they are fond of Military ostentation.

The Modi-Doval doctrine has a lot of plumbing to be done in wake of the recent changes in the region. Threat of Islamic State in India may be a bit farfetched but it cannot be dismissed, possibility of IS-Taliban-Pakistan trio scenario may not appear in the near future but it is definitely a possibility as Pakistan would use any chance to keep the Pasthunism under control, continue to extirpate the Balochistan movement and to keep pushing terrorists into Kashmir valley. One can say it is bad luck for India, as western nations are snubbing India with regards to Afghanistan, the recent changes in the region do not give an optimistic outlook for India and now they have be more prepared and vigilant in matters of external and internal security.

References:

1. Indian Frontier Policy by General Sir John Miller Adye